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INTRODUCTION:
"WHAT IS MEANING IN A LEGAL TEXT?"
A FIRST DIALOGUE FOR LAW AND
LINGUISTICS
JUDITH N. LEVI*
This Essay reviews the interdisciplinary events that led to the 1995
conference entitled, What is Meaning in a Legal Text? A Dialogue Among
Scholars of Law and Linguistics. The transcribed proceedings of this
conference form the core of this special issue of Washington University
Law Quarterly. This Essay begins by describing the development of interest
within linguistics over the last two decades in the language of legal
processes, continues by tracing the evolution of the conference from a 1993
collaborative research project carried out by one law professor and three
linguists, and concludes with some personal observations of the author on
the benefits that linguists like herself stand to gain from further interdisci-
plinary efforts in this domain.
I. PRELUDE: LAW AND LINGUISTICS BEFoRE 1993
We can attribute various birthdates to the discipline of linguistics, some
going back into ancient history with others placed at diverse points in the
last century or two. However, it is a fact beyond dispute that the discipline
in the United States experienced extraordinary growth and unprecedented
intellectual expansion following the publication in 1957 and 1965 of Noam
Chomsky's two seminal works on transformational grammar, Syntactic
Structures' and Aspects of the Theory of Syntax,2 respectively.'
The major thrust of the Chomskyan revolution was in theoretical
linguistics, comprising those subfields of linguistics that focus on analyzing
the structure and organization of the largely unconscious yet wondrously
complex knowledge that humans have of their native language(s). These
* Associate Professor of Linguistics, Northwestern University.
I. NOAM CHOMSKY, SYNTACTIC STRUCTURES (1957).
2. NOAM CHOMSKY, ASPECTS OF THE THEORY OF SYNTAX (1965).
3. See generally FREDERICK J. NEWMEYER, LINGUISTIC THEORY IN AMERICA: THE FIRST
QUARTER-CENTURY OF TRANSFORMATIONAL-GENERATIVE GRAMMAR (1980).
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subfields correspond to the various subsystems of language that make up
our linguistic knowledge, including phonology (the study of sound patterns
in human languages), morphology (the study of how words are structured
in human languages), syntax (the study of how sentences are organized in
human languages), and semantics and pragmatics (the study of how
meaning is communicated in human languages, both in terms of the
language itself and in terms of the context in which that language is used).
The decades since the 1960's have seen, however, not only unprecedent-
ed development of theoretical linguistics but also the development of a
broad spectrum of other subfields that overlap in focus and methodology
with other disciplines. These subfields include sociolinguistics (the study
of language in society, and of the mutual influence of social and language
variables) andpsycholinguistics (the study of how the human brain enables
us to use and understand language, and of how children learn language), as
well as such other subfields as anthropological linguistics, computational
linguistics, and mathematical linguistics. While theoretical linguistics for
many years focused on the study of language in ways that were thought to
be "independent of context," linguists in other subfields, especially
sociolinguistics and psycholinguistics, were from the start intensely
interested in how context affects language use and language behavior.
Of course, one such context that would have been a natural for such
study is the legal system. Nevertheless, the importance of studying
language in the legal context began to become clear to linguists only
recently, mostly in just the last decade. In turning their attention to
language use in legal contexts, the linguists joined a larger number of social
scientists from other disciplines (such as psychology, sociology, political
science, and anthropology) who themselves had come somewhat belatedly
to the study of language and law, but who had begun to contribute to this
interdisciplinary domain in the 1970's and 1980's.4
A major step forward for the nascent interdisciplinary field of language
and law took place in 1985 in the form of a conference entitled, "Language
in the Judicial Process," the first-and still the only-U.S. conference to
focus solely on social science research on language and law. Organized by
two linguists and funded by the National Science Foundation, the
4. For more information on the historical development of social science research on language and
law in the United States, see Judith N. Levi, The Study of Language in the Judicial Process, In
LANGUAGE IN THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (Judith N. Levi & Anne Graffam Walker eds., 1990); and JUDITH
N. LEVI, LANGUAGE AND LAW: A BIBLIOGRAPHIC GUIDE TO SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH IN THE U.S.A.
iv-vi (1994).
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conference took place at Georgetown University in conjunction with the
1985 Summer Linguistics Institute of the Linguistic Society of America.
The conference broke new ground by bringing researchers from across a
wide variety of disciplines together for the first time to discuss their shared
intellectual focus: language in the legal context.5
The conference encompassed two domains of language and law: One was
primary research performed by social scientists bringing their respective
disciplinary foci to the special world of the law (from social psychological
judgments by jurors of witnesses, to representations of legal reality in
lawyer-client conversations, to narrative structure in plea bargaining), while
the second was the application of specifically linguistic expertise to actual
legal cases, both civil and criminal. This latter area, often referred to as
"forensic linguistics," has seen considerable growth in the last decade, as
increasing numbers of litigation attorneys discover the potential value of
bringing a linguist onto a case as consultant and/or expert witness.6
Although the evidence suggests that use of linguists as consultants and/or
expert witnesses is on the rise, the number of linguists who publish articles
in this area with any regularity remains quite small.7 Moreover, the number
of linguists who published in collaboration with legal scholars on topics of
interest to both linguistic and legal scholarship, such as interpretation of
legal texts, was zero-until a most unusual opportunity presented itself to
Clark Cunningham, Professor of Law at Washington University, in the
summer of 1993.
At that time, the editors of the Yale Law Journal asked Cunningham to
review the newly published book, The Language of Judges8 by Lawrence
M. Solan, one of the few practicing attorneys in the U.S. to have earned a
Ph.D. in linguistics before receiving his J.D. In that book, Solan examined
a series of Supreme Court cases centering on language, and focused his
attention on the quality of the linguistic analysis that the Justices provided
in their decisions. He writes at the beginning of his book, "[a]s we will see
5 Papers from that conference formed the core of a collection that was published several years
later See LANGUAGE IN THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 4.
6 For a summary of such cases, see Judith N. Levi, Language as Evidence: The Linguist as
Expert Witness in North American Courts, I FORENSIC LINGUISTICS 1 (1994). For a bibliography of
such cases, see LEVI, LANGUAGE AND LAW: A BIBLIOGRAPHIC GUIDE TO SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH
IN THE U.S.A., supra note 4, at 40-43.
7 That number may rise as a result of the availability of a new forum for scholarly and
professional exchanges on this subject, namely, Forensic Linguistics: The International Journal of
Speech, Language, and the Law, which Routledge began publishing in 1994.
8 LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF JUDGES (1993).
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throughout this book, their use of linguistic argument as justification [for
their decisions] is by no means consistent, and is frequently incoherent and
idiosyncratic"' and observes near the end:
For each interpretive principle that becomes the rule of law, even in cases in
which it is relatively easy to apply, there will always be instances in which
judges will want to avoid applying it because its application would lead to
what the judge perceives as an injustice. Thus, we saw that courts regularly
attempt to see plain meaning where ambiguity exists and to find ambiguity
where there is none in order to subvert principles like the rule of lenity, the
rule that ambiguous insurance policies are interpreted against the insurer and
the plain language rule.'
Thus, Solan argues that some of the language-centered cases decided by
Supreme Court Justices (and by judges in the courts below) reflect attempts
at reaching decisions that are guided by the facts of the language-but
attempts which fail for lack of accurate analysis of those facts, while others
reflect attempts to mask nonlinguistic justifications in the cloak of a "the-
language-made-me-do-it" argument.
In planning his review of Solan's book, Cunningham decided that it
might be instructive to test Solan's hypothesis about the potential value of
linguistic expertise in judicial decision-making by attempting to provide
informed, expert linguistic input to the Justices prior to their decisions on
language-centered cases. He would do this by culling those cases that raised
interesting language issues from the set of all those yet to be argued in the
fall term, and by inviting a number of linguists to analyze the language in
dispute in those cases. His recruiting efforts brought Green, Kaplan, and
myself onto the project.
Cunningham identified three important language-centered cases from the
set to be argued in the fall term," which were then distributed, with some
expected overlap, among the three linguists, while Cunningham continued
his review of Solan's book. However, the project rapidly evolved into a
four-way, four-author collaboration on all fronts. Some half-dozen major
drafts and many late nights later, the article was sent in galley form to all
nine Supreme Court Justices as well as to the attorneys of record in the
three cases which we had analyzed within the article, which appeared as
9. Id. at 1.
10. Id. at 186.
11. United States v. Staples, 971 F.2d 608 (10th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 114 S. Ct. 1793 (1994); United
States v. Granderson, 969 F.2d 980 (1Ith Cir. 1992), affd, 114 S. Ct. 1259 (1994); and National Org.
for Women v. Scheidler, 968 F.2d 612 (7th Cir. 1992), revd, 114 S. Ct. 798 (1994).
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Plain Meaning and Hard Cases in the April 1994 issue of the Yale Law
Journal.2 The first law-linguistics collaborative article to focus on
statutory interpretation, it became cited in three Supreme Court decisions
of that term (including two of the three cases analyzed within the
article).13
Because one of the three cases in the Yale article centered on an analysis
of the scope of the word knowingly (i.e., which parts of the sentence were
modified by it), the Plain Meaning co-authors chose to offer an amicus
brief in another case involving the scope of that word, United States v. X-
Citement Video, Inc.,'4 which was argued in the 1994 term. It did so with
Cunningham serving as the attorney of record for the newly-formed "Law
and Linguistics Consortium," which the brief characterized as follows:
The Law and Linguistics Consortium is a recently formed association of
lawyers and linguists interested in applications of linguistics to legal
problems. Its founding members are: Clark D. Cunningham, Professor of
Law, Washington University; Georgia M. Green, Professor of Linguistics,
University of Illinois (Urbana-Champaign); Jeffrey P. Kaplan, Associate
Professor of Linguistics, San Diego State University; Judith N. Levi,
Associate Professor of Linguistics, Northwestern University; and Lawrence
M Solan, Partner, Orans, Elsen and Lupert, New York City. One goal of the
Consortium is to make available to courts faced with questions of statutory
interpretation information about how a statutory provision would be
understood as a matter of ordinary language."5
The formation of the Law and Linguistics Consortium was the first hint
of things to come, in that it created an informal framework for expanding
the circle of scholars interested in bridging law and linguistics. The next
step was a roundtable discussion at the annual meeting of the Law and
Society Association in Phoenix in June 1994.16 Led by the Plain Meaning
co-authors and joined by Professor Fred Schauer as a participant-discussant,
12 Clark D. Cunningham et al, Plain Meaning and Hard Cases, 103 YALE L.J. 1561 (1994).
13 See Staples, 114 S. Ct. 1793, 1806; Granderson, Director, Office of Workers' Compensatin
Programs v. Greenwich Collieries, 114 S. Ct. 1259, 1267; 114 S. Ct. 2251, 2255 (1994). For a more
detailed history of the preparation of this article, and judicial responses to it, see Jeffrey P. Kaplan,
Georgia M. Green, Clark D. Cunningham, and Judith N. Levi, Bringing Linguistics into Judicial
Decision-Making: Semantic Analysis Submitted to the U.S. Supreme Court, 2 FORENSIC LINGUISTICS
(forthcoming 1995).
14 115 S. Ct. 464 (1994).
15 Brief Amicus Curiae of the Law and Linguistics Consortium in Support of Respondents,
United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 464 (1994) (No. 93-723) (on file with author).
16 Law and Society Association Annual Meeting (June 18, 1994).
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the discussion presented the Yale Law Journal project to an interdisciplin-
ary audience of scholars and legal practitioners in order to seek feedback
on ways of extending such efforts.
II. CREATING A FORUM FOR FURTHER DIALOGUE
As we were contemplating what might be an appropriate direction for
future collaborative efforts, it occurred to me that a fruitful next step might
be to seek funding for a small, invitational brainstorming conference that
would bring together legal and linguistic scholars to plan a future research
agenda and to explore other possibilities for bringing law and linguistics
closer together. It seemed reasonable to expect that brainstorming in a
larger group about "what next?" could also be a useful way of expanding
the circle of linguistic and legal scholars interested in the intellectual and
professional connections between law and linguistics.
In fall of 1994, we were awarded funding from Northwestern
University's University Research Grants Committee for a small conference
to take place at Northwestern over one long weekend in the spring of 1995.
Soon thereafter, Professor Cunningham and the Washington University Law
Quarterly obtained additional funding from Washington University School
of Law to cover the remaining costs of the conference, including the costs
of having court reporters transcribe the proceedings to facilitate subsequent
publication.17
Because the primary purpose of the conference would be to brainstorm,
we wanted to keep the atmosphere informal and the number of participants
small, and so we planned for a group of just twelve: six from linguistics
and six from law.'8 As we sought funding, we had three linguists and
three law professors already committed to the enterprise; the three linguists
were those from the Plain Meaning project-Georgia M. Green, Jeffrey P.
Kaplan, and Judith N. Levi-and the three law professors were Clark D.
Cunningham (the originator of the Plain Meaning group), as well as
Frederick Schauer of Harvard University's John F. Kennedy and Robert
Bennett, Dean of Northwestern's Law School.
For the remaining slots, we knew we wanted to find scholars who were
active researchers in the area we had chosen to concentrate on, interpreta-
17. Our third source of funding was Dean Robert Bennett of Northwestern University School of
Law, who generously contributed some of his own research funds to the project.
18. We were actually thirteen for a small part of the conference; Cass Sunstein of the University
of Chicago was able to join us on Friday, but had to leave for a speaking engagement on Saturday, and
was unexpectedly prevented from returning on Sunday.
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tion of language (in and beyond legal texts); who would be both good
teachers and good listeners in an extended cross-disciplinary conversation;
who might be persuaded to continue the collaborative effort in both
research and mutual education beyond the weekend conference; and who
represented a variety of institutions and scholarly circles so that each one
could bring news of the dialogue back to his or her own colleagues, thereby
spreading the word through a ripple effect. For the law professors in
particular, we looked for people who would be new to working with
linguists, but whose history provided evidence of openness to interdisciplin-
ary dialogue. For the linguists, we wanted specialists in semantics and
pragmatics (the two subfields of linguistics focused on meaning) who had
some prior experience in bridging law and linguistics, through research
and/or consulting.
The number of legal scholars interested in interpretation far exceeds the
number of linguistic scholars known to be interested in law, so we knew
that choosing from the first group especially would necessarily exclude
many qualified participants. But given the experimental nature of our
gathering, we felt that it would not be such a bad result if it turned out that
even more people wished they had been invited to this event than we could
manage to include. And so we proceeded, and were very happy to add to
the roster of law professors William N. Eskridge, Jr., Kent Greenawalt,
Michael Moore, and (for a limited time) Cass Sunstein; and to the roster of
linguistics professors Charles Fillmore, Michael L. Geis, and Jerrold M.
Sadock."
III. DESIGNING A STRUCTURE FOR CREATIVE INTERACTION
Having established a conference venue, conference funding, and a full
roster of conference participants, we now had to face these new questions:
In the absence of formal presentations, what shall we do with these people
for three whole days? How can we hold fruitful discussions across the
knowledge gap between the two professions? More generally, how can we
create a format that will provide enough structure to keep discussions
focused and productive, yet enough freedom to foster creativity and
innovation?
Pooling our own past conference experiences, both positive and negative,
and drawing on the (sometimes contradictory) advice of three experts
19. For biographical information on each of the participants, see Law and Linguistics Conference,
73 WASH. U. L.Q. 785, 785-89 (1995).
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whom I consulted on organizing small brainstorming workshops, we chose
to prepare for the conference by relying on these organizing features:
1. We assembled two tutorial reading packets (one with introductory
readings in semantics and pragmatics for the law professors, one
with introductory readings on legal interpretation for the linguists)
of approximately 200 pages each, and requested that each participant
read the appropriate packet before the conference.
The packets were designed to create some common intellectual
ground and to educate each side on some fundamental notions from
the other, thus enabling us to avoid wasting precious conference
time on Law 101 and Linguistics 101 lectures.2'
2. We elicited suggestions for agenda topics from all participants, to
give the conference co-organizers some sense of direction for further
planning. Following the expert advice, however, no firm agenda was
fixed prior to the conference itself, and the meetings were planned
on a day-to-day basis, with continuing input from all participants.
3. We chose to have two co-moderators to share the burden and vary
the pacing of moderating the discussions, while freeing the other
participants from this administrative responsibility.
4. Following an introductory session in which we elicited suggestions
for discussion topics, we devoted most of our first full day to a
series of three small group discussions focused on specific legal
cases or hypotheticals, materials for which had been prepared by
Professor Cunningham and sent to all participants to read before
arrival. Each group was composed of two linguists and two lawyers,
with composition of the groups rotating so as to introduce all
participants by the end of the day.
These small-group discussions served three purposes: to "warm up"
for the full-group discussions to follow, to help participants get
acquainted with each other and with the other discipline's approach
to interpretive analysis, and to provide very focused discussions out
of which more general principles and issues would emerge.
5. Following the collective will (and our initial plans), we devoted all
of the remaining time to full-group discussions, inspired by the
issues that arose in the small groups. These sessions were recorded
by court reporters for later publication.
20. We also designated two linguists and two law professors as resources to whom anyone could
turn with questions for clarification on the readings.
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6. Meals were taken together at local restaurants to permit participants
to continue informal discussion in less structured settings.
The combination of the above features provided for a highly structured
first day (with topics and discussion groups preassigned), followed by a
more fluid interactional dynamic among the entire group for the balance of
the conference.
IV. A READER'S GUIDE TO THE SCORE
The Annotated Table of Contents, to which the reader is referred,2'
provides headings to indicate the range of specific topics covered during
the conference, and convenient summaries of the comments made by
participants speaking in each of those sections. The reader will readily
observe that the range of discussion topics proposed by participants in the
Friday morning session, and returned to in the Friday evening session, is
much broader than the set of topics actually addressed during the
conference. This should not be surprising, given that the agenda topics
suggested on Friday would suffice for a dozen comparable conferences (and
we do hope that ours is not the last of its genre). However, the rapid flow
and intense heat of the full-group discussions on Saturday and Sunday
indicated that the participants had become fully engaged in one initial set
of topics of greatest shared interest, which proved to be plenty for one
single weekend.
It will be helpful in reading the transcript to remember that its discourse
structure reflects both the excitement and the complex entanglements
inherent in an active twelve-way discussion. Thus, a participant keen to
respond to one speaker might have to wait a number of turns before
gaining the floor to comment on a point made several turns back.
Alternatively, a pertinent topic introduced at one point by one participant
might not always be picked up and expanded upon by any of the eleven
others. However, despite such minor discontinuities, the following three
major topics gained the largest share of the discussion throughout the
conference:
I. How do the two disciplines differ in their use of the key words
meaning, interpretation, text, and even statute? What are the
implications of these differences for understanding the process of
legal interpretation (or construction) of, say, statutory language?
(This subject was addressed throughout most of the Saturday
21. Law and Linguistics Conference, supra note 19, at 790-94.
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discussions, but see especially "A Vehicle in the Park by Any Other
Name . .. " where the differences between the two professions
became most apparent.)22
2. What makes linguistics a science? 3 What does linguistics have to
offer to the legal world that is different, say, from what literary
criticism or philosophy of language has to offer? What understand-
ings does it have to offer that are not available to competent
speakers of English like lawyers and judges, or for that matter,
jurors?
3. What, if anything, can linguistics contribute to an understanding of
interpretation that changes over time, as in the case of statutory or
constitutional interpretation? Can the concept of "regulatory
variables" (a term created in a small group discussion on Friday to
characterize how legal interpreters may go beyond the conventional
meaning of the language to arrive at a satisfactory application of it)
permit us to make more precise our understanding of the different
roles played in legal interpretation by (a) the language itself, and (b)
the legal tradition itself?24
Additional topics that received more limited attention included:
4. What is the legal status of documents, such as contracts, that are so
"incompetent" that one or more signing parties cannot understand
them? What are the legal, ethical, and linguistic issues raised by
documents that laypeople cannot be expected to understand but by
which they are legally bound, as in the case of many if not most
contracts?2
5
5. What can linguistics contribute to improving comprehensibility of
jury instructions?
6. What can linguistics, especially linguistic pragmatics, contribute to
areas of the law that focus on audience understanding, such as
contract law, defamation law, and jury instructions?
7. What does linguistics have to offer in the domain of word meaning
22. Law and Linguistics Conference, supra note 19, at 839-74. This topic is also the focus of two
articles in this volume. See Michael L. Geis, The "Meaning" of Meaning in Law, 73 WASH. U. L.Q.
1125 (1995); Peter M. Tiersma, The Ambiguity oflnterpretation: Distinguishing Interpretation from
Construction, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1095 (1995).
23. Law and Linguistics Conference, supra note 19, at 898-919.
24. The concept of regulatory variables is explored in detail in William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Judith
N. Levi, Regulatory Variables in Statutory Interpretation, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1103 (1995).
25. Law and Linguistics Conference, supra note 19, at 922-39.
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that judges might want to assist them in decisionmaking? What can
empirical research into word meaning offer that is superior to the
judge's traditional reliance on dictionaries?
8. What parallels exist between the principles of legal interpretation
that go beyond the words on the page (e.g., look to speaker intent,
avoid absurd results), and the principles of linguistic interpretation
analyzed within linguistic pragmatics? Is there something unique to
the process of legal interpretation, or is legal interpretation a special
case of the more comprehensive pragmatic competence of all
speakers of natural languages?
V. LOOKING AHEAD
Since the audience for this journal is primarily a legal one, and is certain
to be made up predominantly of people who have not worked with linguists
before, it might be helpful for this linguist author to specify just why it is
that she enjoys this kind of interdisciplinary dialogue, and why she seeks
it out. It is not that we linguists have any intent to "take over" some central
function of the legal profession. Not only are we far too few to do so, but
we are basically just not interested in undertaking such an impossible and
delusional project. We know full well that the legal profession can manage
to function, as it has for virtually all its history, without any solid or
systematic connection with linguistics. We also know that linguistics does
not need law to carry out its professional interests; after all, we linguists
will never run out of language to study since it is all around us. So there
is no essential, desperately-experienced need-either unilateral or
mutual-that compels us to seek interactions like those at this conference.
In the absence of compulsions, however, there remain many attractions
for linguists in such meetings, and in collaborative projects like that leading
to the Plain Meaning article and the two lawyer-linguist essays in this
volume.26 For one thing, it's very exciting for linguists to encounter other
professionals whose work also immerses them in the puzzles and challenges
of language (our favorite subject), but from an entirely different perspec-
tive. By focusing on some language issue that intrigues us both and
exploring our respective views of it, we each can learn from the other.
Moreover, the new perspective provided by one side can introduce
26. See Clark D. Cunningham & Charles Fillmore, Using Common Sense: A Linguistic Perspective
on Judicial Interpretations of 'Using a Firearm, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1159 (1995); Eskridge & Levi,
supra note 24.
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wonderful new questions, and often satisfying answers, for the other that
would not have otherwise emerged. An example from the Plain Meaning
project is the fact that the linguists were challenged by the facts of the
National Organization for Women v. Scheidler case27 to devise an
empirical test for discovering the conventional meaning of the word
enterprise. In so doing, we discovered that there were two primary
conventional meanings, a pattern we had not suspected before but which
turned out to provide one plausible explanation for the contradictory circuit
court rulings that preceded the case.2" The legal context thus engendered
a linguistic challenge whose exploration led in turn to an insight of legal
significance.29
More generally, the richness and complexity of the institutional context
in which legal interpretation takes place provide a highly tempting subject
for linguistic exploration, especially in the areas of semantics and
pragmatics. As noted above, one recurring theme in the conference was the
relation of pragmatics (as studied by philosophers of language as well as
by linguists) to legal interpretation, while another was the potential
contributions that linguistics could make in the area of determining word
meaning by empirical means. Both of these topics have great potential for
future research, especially if conducted by collaborative law-linguistics
teams.
Another reason that linguists can profit from collaborating with legal
scholars in exploring law-related language issues is that we are forced by
the critical eye and probing questions of the nonlinguist to re-examine our
assumptions (both acknowledged and unconscious) about language and
about linguistics. In this way we are led to distinguish more carefully
between what we can confidently assert to be scientifically valid, and what
we must rethink in the light of the challenges brought by the specific legal
context. For example, the conference raised the fascinating question of the
degree to which pragmatic analyses based on Gricean implicatures apply
to the understanding of a statute with multiple authors over a period of time
27. 114 S. Ct. 798 (1994).
28. See Cunningham et al., supra note 12, at 1610-13. In the same project, it was the linguists'
analysis of the puzzling phrase the original sentence in United States v. Granderson, 114 S. Ct. 1259
(1994), that led Cunningham to research the relevant legislative history. In so doing, he discovered that
the use of the word sentence in the statutory provision in question in Granderson was inconsistent with
its use in the rest of the chapter on sentencing in the United States Code. See Cunningham ct al., supra
note 12, at 1580-1582. This one collaborative project, then, provided the linguists with a fruitful
challenge from the legal side, and the law professor with a productive lead from the linguistic side.
29. For a report of a similar experience, see Cunningham & Fillmore, supra note 26.
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by a multiple, diverse, and ever-evolving audience (including both citizens
and judges, and across one or more generations).3" A collaborative
exploration of this topic too promises great rewards for both linguistic and
legal scholarship.
Lastly, although linguists qua linguists take no normative position on the
degree to which the language facts alone should influence a judicial
interpretation (i.e., linguists are neither a priori textualists nor the opposite),
still we who have been trained in the world of linguistic theory find it very
refreshing to bring that theory out into a real-world context like the law.
Here, our claims and our discoveries can be tested and, if found valuable,
have a significant impact on the lives of real people. This is a satisfaction
that linguists who do not reach across to other disciplines may have to
forego.
These, then, are some of the reasons why linguists enjoy working with
legal scholars on questions of mutual interest. Those of us already engaged
in such an enterprise look forward to welcoming additional colleagues from
the legal world (and from linguistics, for that matter) to this mutually
edifying and exciting enterprise.
Our primary purpose in organizing this conference was to expand the
circle of scholars from both law and linguistics interested in exploring
shared intellectual concerns and possible intellectual connections. Put more
simply, we wanted to get more people talking about law and linguistics. As
both the transcript and the size of this volume make evident, we appear to
have satisfied this initial objective. We will be listening eagerly for the
ways in which additional voices will expand and enrich this first dialogue
between law and linguistics.
30. See Law and Linguistics Conference, supra note 19, at 825-38.
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